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ENCOURAGING SAVINGS UNDER THE EARNED INCOME
TAX CREDIT: A NUDGE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
Vada Waters Lindsey*
During 2007, 3.6 million or 9.7% of people in the United States age 65 or older
were below the poverty level. In light of the number of elderly people living below
the poverty level, it is important that everyone, including low-income workers,
have the opportunity to save for retirement. Low-income workers face many challenges to saving for retirement. The barriers to saving include the lack of access to
retirement plans and lack of investment savvy. For example, only 42% of workers
employed in service occupations in the private industry have access to employer retirement plans. The percentage drops to 39% for part-time employees.
This Article proposes that the earned income tax credit (EITC) be expanded to encourage saving to help reduce the poverty level. The Article argues that the EITC
should be structured to “nudge” low-income workers to invest in retirement plans
and individual retirement accounts to lower the likelihood that they will live below
the poverty level at retirement. The Article then discusses the importance of saving
and the ways in which the government has encouraged lower income workers to
accumulate wealth. Because these efforts have not succeeded in increasing the savings rate of low-income workers, the government must take additional measures to
encourage them to save. This Article outlines a detailed plan for the adoption of a
saving component to the EITC and outlines the importance of automatic contributions in conjunction with the EITC to maximize the success of the saving
component. The plan also includes a government match in certain circumstances
but requires forfeiture of the match for early withdrawals.

I. Introduction
Generally, retirees rely on the “three-legged stool” of Social Se1
curity, pension plans, and personal savings. However, while
upper-income taxpayers frequently take advantage of the tax incentives provided by traditional 401(k) retirement plans and
Individual Retirements Accounts (IRAs), lower-income taxpayers

!"
Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. B.A., Michigan State
University; J.D., DePaul University College of Law; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful for comments from my colleagues who participated in a Marquette Worksin-Progress Workshop. I am also grateful to Erica Hayden, Marquette University Law School
Class of 2010, for her invaluable research assistance. This Article is dedicated to the memory
of my dear sister, Veronica Flournoy.
1.
Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged
Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 938, 939 (2007).
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generally do not invest in these tax-deferred savings vehicles. Empirical data establishes that, of the baby boomers, the wealthiest
10% own more than two-thirds of the capital investments and pri3
vate retirement assets. Significantly, of the balance of the baby
4
boomers, 30% of them did not own any private retirement assets.
This savings gap will have tremendous ramifications if not addressed.
For the first time since the Great Depression, the personal sav5
ings rate for Americans is negative. In 2006, one study found that
44% of retirees are at risk of falling below their current standard of
6
living in retirement. The same study found that the situation is
getting more serious over time. About 35% of baby boomers born
7
between 1948 and 1954 will have insufficient retirement income.
This number increases to 44% for baby boomers born between
1955 and 1964 and then rises to 48% for Generation Xers born
8
between 1965 and 1974. In 2007, 3.6 million or 9.7% of people in
the United States age sixty-five or older were below the poverty lev9
el, up from 9.4% in 2006. The number of people age sixty-five and
over living below the poverty level grew by 200,000 between 2006
10
and 2007. In 2007, an additional 2.4 million or 6.4% of these individuals were considered to be “near poor” because their income
11
was between the poverty level and 125% of the poverty level. The
12
poverty rate for women was startlingly high, particularly among
Hispanic and African American women. For 2007, the poverty rate

2.
Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Lipstick, Light Beer, and Back-Loaded Savings Accounts, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 1101, 1127#28 (2006).
3.
John Burritt McArthur, Private Pensions and the Justification for Social Security, 48 S.
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 28–29 (2006).
4.
Id. at 29.
5.
Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About
Health, Welfare, and Happiness!103 (2008).
6.
Alicia H. Munnell et al., Do Households Have a Good Sense of Their Retirement Preparedness?, Ctr. for Retirement Res. at B.C., 1 (Aug. 2008), http://crr.bc.edu/images/
stories/ib_8-11.pdf.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and
Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007, at 12-13 (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf.
10.
Id. at 12.
11.
Admin. on Aging, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., A Profile of Older
Americans: 2008, at 11 (2008), available at http://www.aoa.gov/AOARoot/Aging_
Statistics/Profile/2008/docs/2008profile.pdf.
12.
For a discussion of outlining proposals to the Social Security program to counter
the poverty rate of elderly women, see Julia J. DiPasquale, Social Security Reform: Keeping Elderly Women Out of Poverty, 4 Nat’l Acad. Elder L. Att’ys J. 183 (2008).
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for Hispanic and African American women who resided alone was
13
39.5% and 39%, respectively.
The number of elderly people living below the poverty level
demonstrates the crucial nature of retirement savings. The earned
income tax credit (EITC) can be a fundamental tool for encouraging saving to help reduce poverty among the elderly population.
The EITC is the largest tax benefit program for working individu14
als. It provides substantial tax dollars to the working poor and
other low-income workers. For example, for taxable year 2009, the
15
maximum EITC was $5,657. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
granted EITC benefits of approximately $48 billion to around 24
16
million taxpayers during taxable year 2007.
17
The current unemployment rate is 9.7%. In light of current
18
economic conditions, the IRS anticipates that, based on reduced
19
wages, more taxpayers will be eligible to receive the EITC. It is
therefore important to consider whether the EITC is an effective
tax incentive or whether statutory modification is necessary to further enhance the credit to better achieve the policy goals of the
EITC.
One significant flaw of the EITC that suggests modification is
warranted is that recipients currently are not encouraged to save or
invest the increase in the after-tax income resulting from the receipt of the EITC. In fact, the EITC discourages such use by
denying taxpayers with excessive investment income access to the
20
credit. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a lump sum payment may
encourage the recipients to buy an unnecessary “big ticket” item
rather than purchasing more practical consumable items such as
food or paying for energy costs, as noted in the EITC’s legislative
13.
Admin. on Aging, supra note 11, at 11.
14. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax
Credits, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 34 (2006); Timothy M. Smeeding, The Earned Income Tax Credit:
The EITC and USAs/IDAs: Maybe a Marriage Made in Heaven?, 8 Geo. Pub. Pol’y Rev. 7, 8
(2002).
15.
Rev. Proc. 2009-21, 2009-16 I.R.B. 862.
16.
I.R.S. News Release IR-2009-8 (Jan. 30, 2009).
17.
Jobs Still Elusive, 5 States Posted Record Unemployment Rate in January, N.Y. Times, Mar.
11, 2010, at B9. For detailed unemployment statistics, see Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Department of Labor, News Release USDL-10-0886, The Employment Situation—June 2010, at tbl.A-1 (2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
empsit_07022010.pdf.
18. A significant motivation behind the EITC’s enactment in 1975 was an economy in a
period of economic decline, with an unemployment rate of 8.2%, its highest level since
1941. S. Rep. No. 94-36, at 1 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 54, 54. A secondary consideration behind its enactment was the expected stimulation of the economy. Id. at 7-8.
19.
I.R.S. News Release IR-2009-8 (Jan. 30, 2009).
20.
See I.R.C. § 32(i) (West Supp. 2010).
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history. In fact, this history indicates that Congress recognized the
potential for the EITC to enable the working poor to purchase
consumable products. Thus the purchase of a nonessential luxury
item does not completely comport with the statutory intent to provide financial relief to EITC recipients.
An important question thus is whether the EITC should be modified to further encourage low-income workers to save for
retirement. Professor Dorothy Brown recently wrote an article arguing that recipients of the EITC have been unfairly targeted and
22
that tax scholars offered no hope to them. She challenged “politicians, journalists, and academics to acknowledge that we owe more
23
to low-income taxpayers.” I agree that the tax scheme needs to be
modified for the benefit of low-income workers. Specifically, the
EITC should be structured to “nudge” low-income workers to invest in retirement plans and IRAs to lower the likelihood that they
24
will live below the poverty level during retirement.
The federal government recognized the significance of encouraging low-income individuals to engage in long-term savings when
it enacted the saver’s credit and established the “Assets for Independence” program administered by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and
25
Families’ Office of Community Services. Under the Assets for Independence program, participants save earned income in matched
26
“Individual Development Accounts.” Unfortunately, in recent
years, only 10,000 people nationwide have enrolled in the pro27
gram. In addition, the number of taxpayers claiming the saver’s
28
credit has generally declined since its enactment. The federal
EITC program should incorporate the positive aspects of the Assets
for Independence program and the saver’s credit to create more
widespread savings for the working poor and other low-income
workers while eschewing their flaws.
21. But cf. infra text accompanying note 104.
22. Dorothy Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 790, 801
(2007).
23.
Id. at 802.
24.
Thaler and Sunstein suggest that most workers who do not enroll in their employer’s retirement plan are simply procrastinating and may require a nudge, defined as “any
factor that significantly alters the behavior of Humans” to get them to save for retirement.
Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 8.
25.
See About Assets for Independence, Admin. for Children & Families,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/afi/assets.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2010) [hereinafter About Assets].
26.
See id.
27.
Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based
Welfare System, 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 721, 816 (2005).
28.
See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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Part II will discuss the importance of saving and the ways in which
the government has encouraged low-income workers to accumulate
wealth. The approaches adopted by the government involve both
direct expenditures and tax incentives to promote the working poor
and other low-income individuals to increase savings. Part III will
outline federal programs created to promote savings. Part IV will
explore the challenges to increased savings by low-income workers.
The barriers to saving include lack of access to retirement plans and
lack of investment savvy. Part V of this Article will discuss the EITC. It
will consider the purpose of the credit and outline eligibility requirements. It will also extensively analyze the problems with the
current EITC. Part VI will propose the adoption of a saving component to the EITC. Other scholars have suggested that the EITC be
29
linked to an asset-building policy. This Article proposes a detailed
plan for such a policy’s implementation. The proposal outlines the
importance of automatic contributions in conjunction with the
EITC to nudge low-income workers to save for retirement and to
maximize the success of the saving component.
II. The Importance of Saving
During his tenure as a U.S. Senator, Rick Santorum stated that
the significant causes of poverty were the lack of “access to capital
30
and barriers to wealth creation.” According to Santorum, one of
the greatest social problems during the last century was poverty
31
among the elderly. He believed that welfare reform was an important first step towards establishing economic stability for former
recipients, that the cause of the widening gap between the rich and
poor is the asset gap rather than the income gap, and that low32
income individuals must have a chance to accrue savings. The
Office of Community Services, an agency of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services has explained that asset building rather
than income generation is instrumental to ending the cycle of pov33
erty. According to the agency, 25% of households would not be
able to sustain themselves for more than three months if they lost
their income source, and 47% of American children live in
29.
See, e.g., Daniel P. Gitterman et al., Expanding EITC for Single Workers and Couples
Without Children: Tax Relief for All Low-Wage Workers, 15 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y, 245,
249#50 (2008); Smeeding, supra note 14.
30.
Rick Santorum, Wealth Creation in the New Millennium: Transforming Poverty in America, 16 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 383, 383 (2002).
31.
See id.
32.
Id. at 383–85.
33.
About Assets, supra note 25.
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34

households without significant financial assets. Finally, research
conducted by the agency has established that the divorce rate is
lower for families with assets, that families with assets are healthier,
and that future generations of families with assets are less likely to
35
live in poverty.
There are numerous reasons why individuals must also have sufficient savings for retirement. Several factors impact the amount of
savings that are necessary to sustain a retiree for the duration of
retirement, including the expected post-retirement living expenses, anticipated future investment returns, and life expectancy and
36
other relevant mortality statistics. As individuals age, an unexpected and catastrophic medical condition may deplete their life
savings. Individuals must also plan for long-term care needs in re37
tirement, which are frequently ignored in retirement planning.
The current unemployment rate of 9.7% will undoubtedly impact
retirement savings and may require the unemployed to exhaust
long-term savings in order to pay for basic necessities and living
expenses.
Many state and municipal public pension plans are underfund38
ed. The increase in life expectancies means that retirees will need
a higher level of savings to sustain themselves during their retirement. One of the biggest reasons people need to have retirement
savings is that the “pay as you go” Social Security program is in
jeopardy of having a negative balance beginning in 2017, at which
39
point benefits to retirees will exceed Social Security revenue.
Moreover, the average Social Security benefits of $13,836 for re40
tired workers is only slightly greater than the $13,014 poverty
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Term Care, 11
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 407, 409 (2007).
37.
See generally id. (providing an in-depth discussion of types of long-term care and the
different ways to fund such care).
38.
See, e.g., Terry Savage, Battle Brewing over Pensions; Stock Market Crash Leaves State’s
Plans Critical Just as Baby Boomers Set to Retire, Chi. Sun-Times, Jan. 25, 2009, at A20 (stating
that the Illinois state-funded pension system is more underfunded than any other state and
that the plans were approximately 50% of the required funding level); Jeff Shields, City Not
Behind Pa. Idea on Pensions, Phila. Inquirer, July 4, 2009, at B01 (stating that the Philadelphia municipal pension plan is currently funded at 53% but projected to go below 50% by
June 2010 and remain so for many years).
39.
See Befort, supra note 1, at 943. Professor Befort explains that the negative balance
in the Social Security program will arise because of the increasing life spans and retirement
of impending baby boomers and the decline in the number of future wage earners resulting
from the decline in birth and immigration rates. Id. at 943#44.
40.
Soc. Sec. Admin., SSA Pub. No. 13-11785, Fast Facts & Figures About Social
Security, 2009, at 15 (2009), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/
fast_facts/2009/fast_facts09.pdf.
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41

threshold for a householder 65 years and older for 2008. The Social Security program has succeeded in reducing the level of
42
poverty among the elderly. However, according to Santorum, demographic changes in family sizes, life-spans, and the retirement of
baby boomers will continue to thwart the effectiveness of the “pay43
as-you-go” scheme. By 2050, 20% of Americans will be over age
44
sixty-five. The demographic changes will result in an unfunded
45
liability in the program of at least $3.2 trillion by 2030. As a result,
Social Security benefits should not be relied on as a retiree’s only
revenue stream during retirement.
III. Federal Programs to Promote Savings
The federal government has implemented both direct expenditures and tax incentive programs to promote increased savings by
the working poor and other low-income individuals. It is important
to understand how the EITC fits within the context of other federal programs. Any modification to the EITC to encourage savings
will supplement these existing programs. The Internal Revenue
Code contains numerous tax incentives encouraging retirement
46
saving and other forms of investments. An employee is entitled to
defer income for contributions made by the employer and em47
48
ployee to a qualified defined contribution or defined benefit
41.
Poverty Thresholds for 2008 by Size of Family and Number of Related Children Under 18
Years, U.S. Census Bureau (2008), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshold/
thresh08.html (last visited May 12, 2010).
42.
See Santorum, supra note 30, at 387#88.
43.
Id. at 388. According to Santorum, “[i]n 1960, there were over five workers for every beneficiary. Today there are three and a half workers per beneficiary, and by 2030 there
will be just over two.” Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Unfortunately, the tax subsidies have primarily benefited upper income taxpayers.
See Creola Johnson, Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: First We Need a Bed and a Car, 2000
Wis. L. Rev. 1221, 1228 (stating that the rich and middle class are able to take advantage of
the tax benefits of retirement savings but the low income individuals do not have the same
opportunities); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1275, 1275#76 (1991) (“The highest subsidies are paid to
affluent consumers who need pensions the least, while those most in need often have no
pension coverage at all.”).
47.
The requirements for qualification are set forth in I.R.C. § 401(a).
48.
Defined benefit plans provide employees with lifelong retirement benefits based
on how long they have been with the employer and how much money they have made. They
place the investment risk on the employer while defined contribution plans place the investment risk on the employee. Befort, supra note 1, at 947. According to the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, most employers are now offering defined contribution plans rather than
defined benefit plans. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, National
Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the United States,
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retirement plan until the contributions are distributed because
49
contributions are deductible. A key benefit of the qualified retirement plan is that the employee is not required to forfeit
employer contributions once the employee meets the vesting requirements. Under the Internal Revenue Code, an employee must
be fully vested in the employee’s own contributions in order for
the plan to be considered a qualified defined benefit or defined
50
contribution plan. In other words, an employee’s contributions to
a pension plan must be nonforfeitable; hence, the employee is entitled to 100% of these contributions. An employee, however, may
forfeit employer contributions to a retirement plan if the employee
does not satisfy the requisite years of service. The determination of
when an employee becomes vested in employer contributions depends on whether the plan is a defined benefit or defined
contribution one, the employee’s length of service, and the vesting
51
schedule.
The minimum vesting requirements for a defined benefit plan
are satisfied where an employee is 100% vested in employer contributions and for any accrued benefit from the employer
contributions if the employee has completed at least five years of
52
service. The vesting requirements are also satisfied where an employee is 20% vested after three years of service with increases of
an additional 20% each year until the employee has completed
seven years of service at which time the employee becomes 100%
53
vested in the employer contributions. Consequently, under the
latter vesting schedule, if the employee is terminated from a job
after five years of service, the employee is vested in 60% of the employer contributions but forfeits the additional 40% of employer
March 2006, at 6 (2006) [hereinafter National Compensation Survey], available at
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebsm0004.pdf. For example, there are about 38,000 active
defined benefit plans in effect today, compared to a high of about 114,000 in 1985. Choosing
a Retirement Plan: Defined Benefit Plan, IRS.gov, http://www.irs.gov/retirement/article/
0,,id=108950,00.html (last updated Aug. 5, 2010). During 2006, 21% of workers had access
to defined benefit plans, and 54% of workers had access to defined contribution plans. National Compensation Survey, supra, at 6. The 401(k) plans are the most common form of
defined contribution plans. Under a defined contribution plan, the employee contributes a
percentage of earnings into the employee’s individual 401(k) account and the employer has
the option to “match” a portion of the contribution with its own funds. The employee must
not only determine the contribution percentage but also the investment allocation and
specifics of withdrawal upon retirement. Befort, supra note 1, at 946.
49.
See I.R.C. § 402(g)(1). The maximum amount that can be contributed to a retirement plan is $16,500 in 2009 unless the employee is aged 50 and over where an additional
$5500 “catch-up” contribution is allowed in 2009. See id. § 402(g)(1)(C).
50.
Id. § 411(a)(1).
51.
See id. § 411(a)(2).
52.
Id. § 411(a)(2)(A)(ii).
53.
Id. § 411(a)(2)(A)(iii).
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contributions. With respect to a defined contribution plan, an employee must be entitled to a nonforfeitable interest in 100% of
employer contributions after three years of service, or 20% of employer contributions after two years of service, with an increase of
20% each year until six years of employment at which time the
54
employee is 100% vested.
In addition to employer retirement plans, an individual is also
entitled to claim a deduction for contributions to a traditional IRA
55
subject to an adjusted gross income phase-out. Although not targeted at low-income workers, the deferral of income for
contributions to 401(k) plans and traditional IRAs is the most significant tax incentive that promotes retirement saving under the
Code. In addition, the Roth IRAs provide a valuable tax incentive
that encourages retirement saving. Congress changed the landscape of retirement saving by enacting the Roth IRA under the
56
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. In contrast to traditional IRAs, contributions to Roth IRAs are made on an after-tax basis and are not
57
deductible. While taxpayers are not entitled to a deduction for
the amount contributed to a Roth IRA, distributions are excluded
from gross income if they are made after the contributor reaches
age 59 ½ or becomes disabled, are made to a beneficiary after the
death of the contributor, or are made to a contributor for the pur58
chase of a first home.
Another tax incentive under the Code that is intended to encourage retirement savings is the “saver’s credit.” The saver’s credit
is a nonrefundable credit intended to encourage low-income
54.
Id. § 411(a)(2)(B).
55.
See id. § 219(a). The maximum deduction is $5000 for individuals under age fifty
and $6000 for individuals age fifty and older. Id. § 219(b)(5).
56.
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 302, 111 Stat. 788, 825#29.
57.
I.R.C. § 408A(c)(1). The Roth IRA is completely phased out for married taxpayers
filing a joint return with adjusted gross income of $176,000 or more and for taxpayers using
the filing status of single or head of household with adjusted gross income of $120,000 or
more. IRS, Dep’t of Treasury, Pub. 17, Your Federal Income Tax: For Individuals 131
tbl.17-3
(2009)
[hereinafter
Your
Federal
Income
Tax],
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf. For taxpayers who use the filing status of married
filing separately, the maximum adjusted gross income is either $10,000 or $120,000, depending on whether the spouse lived with the taxpayer during the taxable year. Id. A
taxpayer may convert a regular IRA to a Roth IRA if the taxpayer: (a) transfers the money
during the tax year; (b) has a modified AGI, for Roth purposes, of less than $100,000; and
(c) is not married filing separately. I.R.C. § 408A(c)(1). During taxable year 2010, income
limits on converting a traditional IRA to a Roth IRA have been eliminated. See Staff of
Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Congress, General Explanation of Tax Legislation
Enacted in the 109th Congress 311–13 (Comm. Print 2007), available at http://
www.jct.gov/s-1-07.pdf.
58.
I.R.C. § 408A(d)(2); see also id. § 72(t)(8) (providing the eligibility rules for the
first-time homebuyer including lifetime maximum homebuyer distributions of $10,000).
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workers to make contributions to an IRA or retirement plan. In
order to compute the credit, the taxpayer must multiply an appli59
cable percentage by the taxpayer’s contribution. The maximum
credit for individual taxpayers is $1000 because the maximum
credit is 50% of the contribution and the maximum contribution
60
taken into account is $2000. Where married taxpayers each make
eligible contributions, each spouse is entitled to the credit, for a
maximum credit of $2000. Congress enacted the saver’s credit because it recognized that low-income individuals may have difficulty
saving; a large portion of their disposable income is used to acquire necessities of life, and the tax credit may provide additional
61
resources to save.
Originally enacted as a temporary credit in 2001, Congress made
62
the credit permanent in 2006. IRS statistics establish that between
2002 and 2006, the number of returns claiming the credit has decreased by over 9% and the total amount of the credit claimed by
63
all taxpayers has decreased over 8%. During taxable year 2007,
there was a substantial increase in the number of taxpayers claiming the saver’s credit over the number of taxpayers who claimed it
in 2006 and a substantial increase in the actual credit amount;
however, the increased 2007 credit amount was still lower than the

59.
See id. § 25B. The credit, adjusted for inflation, is claimed on Form 8880 “Credit
for Qualified Retirement Savings Contributions.” That form contains the applicable percentages. For taxable year 2009, the credit is completely phased out for married taxpayers
filing joint returns with adjusted gross income of at least $55,501, for taxpayers using the
filing status of head of household with adjusted gross income of at least $41,626, and for
single taxpayers with adjusted gross income of at least $27,751. See Your Federal Income
Tax, supra note 57, at 260.
60.
I.R.C. § 25B(b).
61.
Specifically, the legislative history states:
The Committee recognizes that the rate of private savings in the United States is low;
in particular many low- and middle-income individuals have inadequate savings or no
savings at all. A key reason for these low levels of saving is that lower-income families
are likely to be more budget constrained with competing needs such as food, clothing, shelter, and medical care taking a larger portion of their income. The
Committee believes providing an additional tax incentive for low- and middle-income
individuals will enhance their ability to save adequately for retirement.
S. Comm. on Finance, Restoring Earnings to Lift Individuals and Empower Families
(Relief) Act of 2001, S. Rep. No. 107-30 § VI(B)(h) (2001); see also Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 618, 115 Stat. 38, 106.
62.
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 812, 120 Stat. 780, 997.
63.
See Selected Historical and Other Data, SOI Bull., Spring 2009, at 121, 128 tbl.1 [hereinafter Historical Data], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09sprbul.pdf. The
number of taxpayers that claimed the credit during 2002 was 5,307,176 but only 5,192,133
claimed it in 2006. Id. The amount of the credit claimed in 2002 was $1,058,219,000; however, the amount claimed during taxable year 2006 was only $893,957,000. Id.
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64

amount claimed in 2002. The nonrefundable aspect of the saver’s
credit may impact the amount of saver’s credits claimed. According
to Professor Befort, the saver’s credit does not encourage lowincome workers to claim it because more than 80% of return eligi65
ble filers do not have any tax liability. To resolve this issue, he
proposes that the federal government convert the saver’s credit to
66
a refundable one. Making the credit refundable will enable an
eligible taxpayer without a tax liability to receive the credit as a refund on the taxpayer’s tax return.
In addition to the tax incentives for retirement saving, in 1998
the federal government also established the “Assets for Independence” program, a direct expenditure program, to promote savings
67
and asset accumulation for low-income individuals. Under the
program, low-income individuals are able to invest earned income
in “Individual Development Accounts” (IDA) sponsored by “community-based [nonprofit organizations] and State, local, and Tribal
governmental agencies” and receive a match on the amount in68
vested.
As of 2007, state-supported IDA programs have been established
69
in 22 states. The targeted population under this program includes
70
recipients of the EITC. The program is designed to encourage
71
low-income individuals to save for the acquisition of a first home,
capitalization of a small business, training, or enrollment in

64.
See id. at 112 fig.A. The number of taxpayers claiming the saver’s credit was approximately six million, and the total credit amount was $997,343,000 in tax year 2007—
representing increases from tax year 2006 of 13.5% and 9.8%, respectively. Id.
65.
Befort, supra note 1, at 985.
66.
Id. at 986.
67.
Community Opportunities, Accountability, and Training and Educational Services
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-285, §§ 401-416, 112 Stat. 2702, 2759#72.
68.
About Assets, supra note 25. For a detailed discussion of the IDA program, see generally Johnson, supra note 46. See also Emily Marroquin, Note, Alleviating Women’s Poverty
Through Asset Development: Promising Directions, 11 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 157 (2004)
(exploring how the IDA program can be used as a tool to alleviate the increasing poverty
rate of women).
69.
State IDA Policy Summary Tables, Ctr. for Soc. Dev., 2-3 tbl.1 (Feb. 28, 2007),
http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/individuals/paper-csd.pdf.
70.
See About Assets, supra note 25.
71.
In light of the numerous foreclosures of subprime loans, the Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED) conducted a survey of IDA participants to see whether they
had lost their homes through foreclosure. See IDA Program Survey on Homeownership and Foreclosure, Corp. for Enter. Dev. (June 2008), http://cfed.org/assets/pdfs/ida_program_
survey_homeown_foreclose.pdf. The CFED surveyed 1212 of the 8000 individuals who used
an IDA account to help acquire a home within the last five years, and respondents reported
that there had been three defaults and four foreclosures. Id. The low foreclosure rate was
attributable to financial education and homeownership counseling both prior and subsequent to the acquisition and review of loan documents by sponsors of the IDA programs. Id.
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72

post-secondary education. A key service provided under the IDA
73
program is financial education. This is a valuable service for individuals who may lack banking and investment experience.
Significantly, however, saving for other purposes, including re74
tirement saving, is not one of the stated objectives. Additional
programs are needed to encourage retirement saving by lowincome workers because the Assets for Independence program
does not promote participant retirement saving.
IV. Challenges to Increased Savings by Low-Income
Workers—Barriers to Saving
A. Lack of Investment Savvy
It is uncontroverted that there is a correlation between a per75
son’s education level and wages. Hence, many recipients of the
EITC may lack the educational background, investment savoirfaire, or resources to set up a traditional or Roth IRA unaided by
an investment professional. Because it is unlikely that a low-income
worker will utilize the services of a financial consultant, special
measures must be established to nudge low-income workers to save
for retirement.
First, in order for the federal government to encourage lowincome retirement saving, the worker must appreciate the significance of retirement saving, and the worker must understand the
different types of retirement savings vehicles. Four federal agencies
72.
See About Assets, supra note 25.
73.
Id.
74.
Professor Creola Johnson argues that the program should be expanded to include
savings for the purchase of automobiles and household durables. See Johnson, supra note 46,
at 1244#45. Professor Johnson is particularly concerned about creating an opportunity for
current and former welfare recipients to accumulate assets for the purchase of durable
goods, and she explains the inability of the use of IDA funds to acquire such goods as the
reason for low participation among welfare or former welfare recipients. Id. Professor Johnson cited Michael Sherraden, the creative force behind the IDA program, for the
proposition that there are substantial national economic benefits with the development of
an asset accumulation program for welfare recipients. Id. at 1229#30. The economic benefits
include “(1) a permanent reduction in poverty, (2) the development of a more economically savvy and productive citizenry, (3) an improvement in the nation’s savings rate, and (4)
the advancement of the nation as a competitor in a global economy.” Id. at 1230.
75.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the median incomes during 2008 for workers twenty-five to sixty-four years old were as follows: $25,689 for workers without a high
school diploma; $33,806 for workers with a high school diploma; $55,729 for workers with a
Bachelor’s degree; and $100,000 for workers with a professional degree. See Current Population Survey, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032009/
perinc/new03_028.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
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are involved in educating individuals to save for retirement: the
Department of Labor, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Department of the Treasury, and the Social Security Admin76
istration. The administrative agencies must continue to educate
the low-income worker about the importance of retirement saving.
The IRS, an agency within the Department of the Treasury, routinely issues notices and fact sheets explaining various tax
77
incentives. It has a user-friendly website that contains all of its
78
publications. However, it is unlikely that the average layperson
visits the site to research tax incentives. More direct communication is required to promote retirement saving amongst the working
poor and other low-income workers.
Lessons can be learned from the recent reforms in the credit
card industry. One of the consequences of those reforms is that
credit card companies must include a disclosure on a statement
about the amount of interest and the required length of repay79
ment where the debtor only pays the minimum balance. The
statement must also contain the amount a debtor must pay in or80
der to pay off the debt in three years. Congress enacted the Credit
Card Reform Law out of concern that minimum payment practices
enhance the problem of unmanageable debt faced by many debtors today and that disclosure will help consumers regain control of
cascading credit card debt in a manner that is “not too onerous for
81
credit card companies.” In light of the challenges that low-income
workers face in accruing sufficient funds for retirement, administrative agencies charged with educating individuals about
retirement need to develop a plan that incorporates direct communication to low-income workers in a manner that is easy to
understand. Low-income workers need the same type of transparency that has been established in the credit card business to help
them make informed choices about saving for retirement.
Second, the IRS must continue to promote the Voluntary Income Tax Assistance (VITA) Program and electronic filing. The
$1.75 billion in EITC benefits paid to commercial tax providers
76.
Colleen E. Medill, Transforming the Role of the Social Security Administration, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 323, 348 (2007).
77.
For example, in January 2010 the IRS issued fact sheet 2010-12 to outline taxable
year 2009 EITC eligibility rules. See EITC Eligibility Rules for 2009 Tax Year Outlined, IRS.gov
(Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=218830,00.html.
78.
See Publications and Notices, IRS.gov, http://www.irs.gov/app/picklist/list/
publicationsNoticesPdf.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
79.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(b)(11) (West 2010); Credit Card Accountability Responsibility
and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734.
80.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(b)(11)(B)(iii).
81.
155 Cong. Rec. H5030 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep. Miller).
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undermines the purpose of the EITC and transfers much needed
82
dollars from the intended recipients. By utilizing the VITA Program, an EITC recipient is able to take advantage of the free tax
preparation services and electronic filing. When a taxpayer files
electronically, particularly where the refund is to be directly deposited into an account at a bank or other financial institution, the IRS’s
payment of the tax refund is significantly accelerated. According to
the IRS, one of the benefits of electronic filing over paper returns is
that, where the refund is directly deposited, refunds may be issued
83
in half the time and within 10 days of electronic filing. An added
benefit of electronic filing is that the tax returns are more accurate
84
as a result of transmission checks. Consequently, increasing the
number of electronic returns may reduce the number of errors on
the EITC returns.
B. Means-Tested Benefit Programs
Low-income individuals may lose entitlement to government
benefits if their investments and other assets exceed a certain
amount. As a result, a recipient of these benefits is encouraged to
spend rather than save. In order to qualify for several direct expenditure programs, an individual must be limited in the amount
of resources or assets owned, including bank accounts. For example, individuals cannot have a net worth exceeding $10,000
(excluding a home and one automobile) when they enroll in the
85
Assets for Independence program. In order for a recipient to be
eligible to receive Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
86
benefits (also known as food stamps), a household is generally
not permitted to have assets greater than $2000 ($3000 if a member of the household is age sixty or older or disabled) or a vehicle
with a fair market value over $4650, unless the vehicle is used to
produce income or the vehicle falls under another allowable ex87
emption. Assets held in retirement accounts, including defined
82.
See Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory Lending, 122 Banking L.J. 483,
490 (2005).
83.
E-File, Free File and Other Electronic Options for 2010, IRS.gov (Jan. 2010), http://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=217790,00.html.
84.
Id.
85.
About Assets, supra note 25.
86.
During 2009, the U.S. Governmental Accountability Office estimated that 33.7 million people receive Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits each month. See
Support for Low-Income Individuals and Families: A Review of Recent GAO Work, GAO, 5 (Feb. 22,
2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10342r.pdf.
87.
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Eligibility, Food & Nutrition Serv., U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/applicant_recipients/eligibility.htm (last
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benefit and contribution plans and IRAs, and the value of a home
88
are not counted toward the allowable assets. In order to determine eligibility for Medicaid, resources such as bank accounts and
89
real estate are considered. The eligibility ceiling varies from state
to state and depends on the eligible group of which the individual
90
is a member. Finally, all states with the exception of Virginia limit
the amount of assets a recipient can have in order to receive the
modern form of welfare benefits, Temporary Assistance for Needy
91
Families (TANF) cash assistance. Most states have asset limits
ranging from $1000 to $3000 and allow some form of vehicle ex92
emption.
C. Low-Percentage of Participation in Employer Qualified 401(k) Plans
1. Percentage of Workers with Access to Retirement Plans
One of the most economically beneficial aspects of many retirement plans is the employer match. Between 1995 and 2005, the
amount of employer contributions to employee pension plans and
93
insurance funds has grown by almost 100%. However, based on
statistics from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, only 65% of all
workers employed in private industry had access to employer re94
tirement benefits in March 2010. In addition, workers in service
industries, part-time workers, and workers in the lowest 25 percentile had less access to employer retirement plans than other types
of workers. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the

visited Sept. 21, 2010). The additional vehicular exemptions include a vehicle with little
equity because it is encumbered with a debt or the use of the car as a home, transport for a
disabled household member, and transportation for long distance travel for work. Id.
88.
See id.
89.
Overview Medicaid Program: General Information, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidGenInfo/
(last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
90.
Id.
91.
See Office of Family Assistance, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program: Eighth Annual Report to Congress,
at XII-101 to XII-102 tbl.12:6 (2008), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/
data-reports/annualreport8/TANF_8th_Report_111908.pdf.
92.
Id.
93.
See Historical Data, supra note 63, at 189 tbl.4. The total employer contributions
have grown each year since 1995. Id. The total employer contributions for tax year 1995 was
$493.6 billion, and the employer contributions made during tax year 2005 was $927.7 billion. Id.
94.
Retirement Benefits: Access, Participation, and Take-Up Rates, U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (Mar. 2010), http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/news.release/ebs2.t01.htm.
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percent of private industry workers with access to retirement bene95
fits is as follows:
Characteristics

Defined Benefit or Defined
Contribution Plans

Management, business and
financial workers

85

Natural resources, construction and
maintenance workers

64

Service occupations

42

Full-time

74

Part-time

39

Union

88

Non-union

62

Wages in the lowest 25 percentile

40

Wages in the highest 25 percentile

84

Goods producing

72

Service producing

63

1 to 99 workers

51

100 workers or more

81

As these statistics show, approximately 40% of workers in service
industries, part-time workers, and workers earning wages in the
lowest 25 percentile, and 51% of workers employed at small businesses have the opportunity to contribute to an employer
retirement plan. This lack of access will continue to serve as a barrier to saving for workers meeting these characteristics.
2. Percentage of Employee Participation in Retirement
Plans Based on Private Industry Workers
In addition to the gap in access to private industry retirement
plans, there is also a disparity in the actual percent of employees
96
participating in these plans. For example, the participation rates
for low-income employees remain low in comparison to higher income employees. Only 20% of workers earning wages in the lowest
25 percentile participate in employer retirement plans, while 75%
of employees with earnings in the highest 25 percentile participate
97
in employer retirement plans. Statistics from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics establish that a participation rate disparity also exists
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
See id.
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based on whether the employee is a full-time or part-time worker.
While 59% of full-time private industry employees participate in
employer retirement plans, only 21% of part-time employees par98
ticipate. Moreover, only 23% of employees working in service ococcupations participate in employer retirement plans, compared to
99
76% of management, business, and financial workers.
3. Percentage of Participation Based on Ethnic Group
A recent study entitled the “Ariel/Hewitt Study” established that
in fifty-seven of the largest businesses in the United States, 401(k)
participation rates across racial and ethnic groups for individuals
earning less than $30,000 were substantially lower than for individ100
The participation rate for
uals earning a higher income.
individuals in all ethnic groups earning less than $30,000 is between 50% and 56%, while the participation rate for individuals
101
earning higher incomes ranges from 75% to 94%. The study
concluded that African Americans and Hispanics had the lowest
participation rates, while Caucasians and Asians had the highest
102
participation rates.
V. The Earned Income Tax Credit
A. Purpose of the EITC and Eligibility Requirements
103

The EITC was enacted in 1975 to offset the impact of Social Security taxes, to provide an incentive for low-income individuals to
work, “to stimulate the economy by funneling funds to persons likely
to spend the money immediately, and to provide relief for low104
income families hurt by rising food and energy prices.” Congress
98.
See id.
99.
See id.
100. See The Ariel/Hewitt Study: A Study of 401(k) Savings Disparities Across Racial and
Ethnic Groups, Ariel Invs., 4, http://www.arielinvestments.com/images/stories/PDF/
arielhewittslides_finalweb_7.3.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
101. See id. Approximately 3 million employees were included in the study, and the data
was collected as of December 31, 2007. The Ariel/Hewitt Study: 401(k) Plans in Living Color,
Ariel Invs. (July 7, 2009), http://www.arielinvestments.com/content/view/1223/1173
[hereinafter Ariel/Hewitt Study].
102. See Ariel/Hewitt Study, supra note 101.
103. For an excellent discussion of the early history of the EITC, see Jonathan Barry
Forman, Improving the Earned Income Credit: Transition to a Wage Subsidy Credit for the Working
Poor, 16 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 41 (1988).
104. Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 864 (1986).
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also enacted the credit to reduce the welfare rolls. Unlike many
106
other credits, the EITC is refundable and a taxpayer receives the
credit even if the taxpayer has no tax liability. It was intended to
provide an incentive for low-income individuals to work by result107
ing in an increase of the worker’s after-tax income. The original
108
EITC was allowed only for taxable year 1975. Congress then ex109
tended the credit for the first six months of 1976. The EITC
110
became permanent in 1978.
The Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to claim the EITC
when the taxpayer meets the eligibility requirements if the taxpay111
er has at least one qualifying child or is between the ages of 25
112
and 65. Congress has made several modifications to the EITC
since its enactment. As originally enacted in 1975, eligible recipi113
ents of the credit had to have a qualifying child. However, in
1993 the federal government enacted a small credit for childless
114
workers. The maximum EITC depends on the amount of the
taxpayer’s earned income, the number of taxpayer’s qualifying
children, credit percentage, and the taxpayer’s marital status. The
maximum EITC is determined by multiplying the taxpayer’s
earned income amount by a fixed percentage of earnings up to an
115
earned income ceiling amount. Once the earned income reaches
the threshold earned income phase-out, the credit is reduced by a

105. See S. Rep. No. 94-36, at 33 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 54, 84 (“[T]he
most significant objective of the provision should be to assist in encouraging people to obtain employment, reducing the unemployment rate and reducing the welfare rolls.”).
106. Nonrefundable credits include the Hope Scholarship Credit and Lifetime Learning Credit, child tax credit, credit for dependent care expenses, and the Saver’s Credit. See
I.R.C. §§ 21, 24, 25A, 25B.
107. S. Rep. No. 94-36, at 11.
108. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 209, 89 Stat. 26, 35.
109. Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-164, § 2, 89 Stat. 970, 971#72.
110. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 103, 92 Stat. 2763, 2771.
111. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A)(i). Per § 32(c)(3)(A), a “qualifying child” is defined under
I.R.C. § 152(c).
112. The taxpayer and any qualifying children must have Social Security numbers, the
taxpayer cannot be a qualifying child or dependent for another taxpayer, the taxpayer’s
principal place of abode must be in the United States for more than one-half of the taxable
year, and the taxpayer cannot have investment income greater than a certain amount. I.R.C.
§§ 32(c)(1)(A)(ii), 32(c)(1)(E), 32(i). For tax year 2009, the investment income cannot
exceed $3100. Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1111.
113. Tax Reduction Act of 1975 § 204.
114. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131, 107 Stat.
433, 433-35.
115. See I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(A). The credit percentage is 7.65% where the taxpayer does
not have any qualifying children, 34% where the taxpayer has one child, and 40% where the
taxpayer has two or more qualifying children. Id.
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phase-out percentage until the credit is reduced to zero. The
maximum credit and phase-out amounts for unmarried taxpayers
117
for taxable year 2009 are as follows:
No
Children

One
Child

Two
Children

Three or
More Children

Maximum EITC

$457

$3,034

$5,028

$5,657

Earned Income
Amount

$5,970

$8,950

$12,570

$12,570

Threshold Earned
Income Phaseout

$7,470

$16,420

$16,420

$16,420

Earned Income
Ceiling Amount

$13,440

$35,463

$40,295

$43,279

Prior to taxable year 2009, the largest possible credit amount was
granted to taxpayers with at least two children. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 (ARRTA) temporarily
increased the EITC for taxpayers with three or more children for
118
taxable years 2009 and 2010.
Married taxpayers are also eligible to claim the EITC. In order
for a married couple to claim the EITC, the couple must file a joint
119
income tax return. The maximum credit and phase-out amounts
for a married couple filing a joint return for taxable year 2009 are
120
as follows:
No
Children

One
Child

Two
Children

Three or
More Children

Maximum EITC

$457

$3,034

$5,028

$5,657

Required Earned
Income

$5,970

$8,950

$12,570

$12,570

Threshold Earned
Income Phaseout

$12,470

$21,420

$21,420

$21,420

Earned Income
Ceiling Amount

$18,440

$40,463

$45,295

$48,279

116. The phaseout percentage is 7.65% where the taxpayer does not have any qualifying children, 15.98% where the taxpayer has one child, and 21.06% where the taxpayer has
two or more qualifying children. Id.
117. Rev. Proc. 2009-21, 2009-16 I.R.B. 862.
118. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1002, 123
Stat. 115, 312.
119. See I.R.C. § 32(d). A taxpayer is entitled to file as “head of household” and claim
the EITC because the taxpayer is considered to be “unmarried.” To qualify, the taxpayer
must be legally separated from the taxpayer’s spouse or if the spouse is not a member of the
taxpayer’s household during the last six months of the year, the taxpayer paid more than
one-half the cost of maintaining a home and the home is a child’s principal place of abode.
See I.R.C. § 7703 (2006).
120. Rev. Proc. 2009-21, 2009-16 I.R.B. 862.

Lindsey ITP 2M.doc

102

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

11/19/2010 1:40 PM

[Vol. 44:1

A married couple may be precluded from claiming the credit
121
because of the so-called marriage penalty. A marriage penalty is
imposed because the statute does not adequately adjust for dual
income. An unmarried couple with dual income and children will
be entitled to a greater EITC than a similarly situated married
couple. For example, for an unmarried couple with two children,
where each parent earns $14,000 in wages and each parent claims
a child as an exemption and for EITC purposes for taxable year
122
2009, each parent will receive the maximum EITC of $3043 for a
combined EITC of $6086. In contrast, due to the marriage penalty,
a married couple with two children receives a smaller EITC. Numerous scholars have argued that Congress should amend the
123
credit to alleviate the marriage tax penalty, and ARRTA finally
lessened the severity of the marriage tax penalty by increasing the
124
phase-out amounts by $5000. Even after the amendment, howev125
er, the married couple’s EITC is only $3642, substantially less
than the combined EITC of $6086 for the unmarried couple. As a
result, there remains a substantial marriage penalty under the
EITC.

121. Many scholars have discussed the EITC’s marriage penalty. See, e.g., Dorothy A.
Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate but Unequal, 54 Emory L.J. 755, 769, 806–07
(2005); Danshera Cords, Paid Tax Preparers, Used Car Dealers, Refund Anticipation Loans, and
the Earned Income Tax Credit: The Need to Regulate Tax Return Preparers and Provide More Free
Alternatives, 59 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 351, 357–59 (2009); George K. Yin, Accommodating the
“Low-Income” in a Cash-Flow or Consumed Income Tax World, 2 Fla. Tax Rev. 445, 477 (1995).
122. The EITC is computed by multiplying the earned income limitation amount by a
credit percentage, which is 7.65% for eligible taxpayers with no qualifying children, 34% for
taxpayers with one qualifying child, 40% for taxpayers with two qualifying children, and
beginning in 2009, 45% for taxpayers with three or more qualifying children. I.R.C.
§ 32(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2010). For the unmarried couple, the credit for each filer is
determined by multiplying the earned income amount of $8950 by 34%. That figure equals
the credit amount of $3043.
123. See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Changing the Subject: From Welfare to a Living Income, 4
Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 14, 22 (2009) (stating that the credit needed further improvement by
easing the marriage penalty); Forman, supra note 103, at 93#95 (exploring several options
which would reduce the marriage penalty); Wendy Richards, Comment, An Analysis of Recent
Tax Reforms from a Marital-Bias Perspective: It Is Time to Oust Marriage from the Tax Code, 2008
Wis. L. Rev. 611, 627#28 (stating marriage penalty discourages taxpayers from working full
time and counters the EITC goals).
124. Rev. Proc. 2009-21, 2009-16 I.R.B. 862.
125. I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(A). The computation of the EITC for the married couple is
more complicated because their earned income exceeds the threshold earned income
phaseout. The earned income amount of $12,570 is multiplied by 40% for a maximum EITC
before the phaseout of $5028. The threshold earned income phaseout is $21,420. Hence,
the married couple’s $28,000 earned income exceeds the threshold earned income amount
by $6580. Pursuant to I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(A), the EITC before phaseout must be reduced by
$1386 ($6580 times the phaseout percentage of 21.06). Consequently, the EITC for the
married couple is $3642.

Lindsey ITP 2M.doc

Fall 2010]

11/19/2010 1:40 PM

Encouraging Savings Under the EITC

103

Currently, 24 states have also enacted the EITC at the state lev126
el. The state EITC provisions vary among states. The states that
have enacted an EITC determine its amount based on a percent127
age of the federal EITC, ranging from 3.5% to 50%. While most
of the states that have enacted the EITC allow for a refundable
128
129
credit, or a partially refundable credit, a few states do not per130
mit an EITC where the taxpayer does not have a tax liability. In
addition, most states are consistent with the federal EITC and allow
an EITC for childless workers, Wisconsin being the sole state that
126. See Jason Levitis & Jeremy Koulish, State Earned Income Tax Credits: 2008 Legislative
Update, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, 1 (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.cbpp.org/files/
6-6-08sfp1.pdf.
127. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1117(a) (2009) (providing a credit of 20% of the
federal EITC); D.C. Code § 47-1806.04(f)(1) (2009) (providing a 40% credit of the federal
EITC); 35 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/212(a) (West 2009) (granting a state EITC of 5% of the
federal EITC); Ind. Code Ann. § 6-3.1-21-6(a) (West 2009) (allowing a state credit equal to 9%
of the federal credit); Iowa Code § 422.12B(1) (2008) (providing a credit of 7% of the federal
EITC); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-32,205(a) (2008) (allowing a state credit of 17% of federal EITC);
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:297.8(a) (2009) (granting a credit equal to 3.5% of the federal credit); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 5219-S(1) (2009) (granting a state credit equal to 4% of
federal credit); Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-704(b)(1) (West 2009) (providing a credit
equal to the lesser of 50% of the federal EITC or the state tax liability); Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
62, § 6(h) (2009) (granting a state EITC of 15% of the federal credit); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 206.272(1)(b) (West 2009) (increasing the state EITC to 20% of federal credit for taxable years beginning 2009); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2715.07(2)(e) (2009) (granting a credit to
workers equal to 10% of the federal credit); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54A:4-7(a)(2)(f) (West 2009)
(establishing a credit equal to 25% of the federal credit beginning in taxable year 2009); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 7-2-18.15(A) (2008) (providing a working families tax credit of 10% of the federal
EITC); N.Y. Tax Law § 606 (d)(1)(vii) (McKinney 2009) (granting a state EITC equal to 30%
of the federal EITC); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-151.31(a)-(c) (2009) (granting a credit equal to
5% of the federal EITC beginning in 2009 but scheduled to sunset in taxable year 2013);
Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 2357.43 (2009) (providing a credit equal to 5% of the federal EITC); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 315.266(1) (2009) (allowing a credit of 6% of the federal EITC); R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 44-30-2.6(N)(1) (2009) (granting a credit of 25% of the federal EITC); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32,
§ 5828b(a) (2009) (allowing of credit of 32% of the federal EITC); Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-339.8
(B)(2) (2009) (providing a credit of 20% of the federal EITC); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 82.08.0206(3) (West 2009) (granting greater of ten% of the federal EITC or fifty dollars);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.07(9e)(af) (West 2009) (granting a credit based upon the number of
qualifying children of 4%, 14%, or 43% of the federal EITC). But see Minn. Stat.
§ 290.0671(1) (2009) (basing its working family credit on a percentage of earned income).
128. D.C. Code § 47-1806.04(f)(3); 35 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/212(b); Ind. Code
Ann. § 6-3.1-21-6(b); Iowa Code § 422.12B(1); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-32,205(b); La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 47:297.8(b); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 62, § 6(h); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 206.272(2); Minn. Stat. § 290.0671(4); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2715.07; N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 54A:4-7(c); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-18.15(B); N.Y. Tax Law § 606 (d)(2); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 105-151.31(b); Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 2357.43; Or. Rev. Stat. § 315.266(5) (2007); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 32 § 5828b(b); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.07(9e)(f).
129. Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-704(b) (granting either a refundable credit of 50%
or a nonrefundable credit equal to 25% of the federal credit); R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-302.6(N)(1) (providing for a refundable credit of 15% of its 25% credit).
130. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1117(a); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 5219-S(4); Va.
Code Ann. § 58.1-339.8(C).
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requires recipients to have at least one dependent child. Interestingly, the state of Washington, which has no state income tax, still
provides a state refundable EITC equal to the greater of 5% of the
federal EITC, or $25 in taxable years 2009 and 2010, and the
greater of 10% of the federal EITC, or $50 for 2011 and subse132
quent years.
B. Problems with the Tax Credit
One large problem with the EITC is that eligible taxpayers neglect to claim it. The IRS estimates that approximately 25% of
eligible taxpayers fail to claim the EITC because they are unaware
133
that they qualify to receive the credit. Another frequent problem
with the administration of the EITC is the high level of erroneous
claims. During taxable year 1999, 27% to 31.7% of the $8.4 billion
134
to $9.9 billion of EITC claims were erroneous. The erroneous
claims result from several common mistakes. The IRS has disallowed the EITC when a married couple failed to file a joint
135
return. On numerous tax returns, taxpayers attempt to claim the
earned income tax credit on the basis of having a qualifying child.
The courts have frequently sustained the IRS’s denial of the credit
136
where a child is not a qualifying child for purposes of the credit.
One possible explanation for taxpayer’s reporting of an ineligible child for EITC purposes is that there have traditionally been
inconsistent rules pertaining to whether a taxpayer is entitled to
the dependency exemption, child tax credit, head of household

131. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.07(9e).
132. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 82.08.0206(3).
133. I.R.S. News Release IR-2008-13 (Jan. 31, 2008).
134. I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-78 (June 13, 2003).
135. See, e.g., McCullough v. Comm’r, No. 14718-04S (T.C. Feb. 21, 2006) (finding that
taxpayer not allowed to amend improperly filed head of household status to married filing
jointly after taxpayer filed a petition with the Tax Court); Newsom v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M.
(CCH) 415 (1999) (finding that EITC disallowed where husband and wife filed separate tax
returns after husband originally filed as a head of household); Mischel v. Comm’r, 74
T.C.M. (CCH) 253 (1997) (finding that EITC disallowed because the married taxpayer did
not file a joint income tax return).
136. See, e.g., Willoughby v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M (CCH) 1302 (2009) (denying credit
where the taxpayer attempted to claim his live-in girlfriend’s daughters as qualifying children); Redmond v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 414 (2008) (denying credit because taxpayer
did not meet her burden that two children were her niece and nephew); Linton v. Comm’r,
85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1436 (2003) (finding taxpayer ineligible to claim children for purposes of
the EITC because they did not reside with the taxpayer for more than one-half of the taxable year).
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filing status, and EITC. The Working Families Tax Relief Act of
138
2004 alleviated some of this inconsistency by creating a uniform
definition of the term “qualifying child,” but did not completely
eliminate the problem of confusion over inconsistent rules. For
example, a taxpayer is entitled to utilize the head of household
filing status and claim a dependency exemption for a “qualifying
139
relative,” but the taxpayer is not entitled to claim such person for
purposes of the EITC and child tax credit. Consequently, a taxpayer can claim an eligible non-relative who resided with the taxpayer
for the entire taxable year for purposes of the dependency exemption, but that taxpayer is unable to claim that non-relative for
140
purposes of the EITC. In addition, the child tax credit is inappli141
cable for a child who turned 17 by the end of the tax year, but for
purposes of the EITC, dependency exemption, and head of
household filing status, the maximum age is generally under the
142
age of nineteen. For purposes of the EITC, dependency exemption, and head of household filing status, the maximum age is
under twenty-four if the taxpayer’s qualifying child is a full-time
143
student. There is no maximum age where the child is perma144
nently or totally disabled.
145
While there are several reasons for erroneous EITC claims, Professor Dorothy Brown has argued that one of the core explanations
is that the IRS and politicians have unfairly targeted the low-income
recipients because they are considered to be pseudo welfare recipi146
ents. Professor Brown states that “[t]he belief that EITC errors are
the result of fraud and not complexity is a function of the mental
137. In Olivio v. Commissioner, No. 311-07S (T.C. Sept. 8, 2008), the 22-year old taxpayer
properly claimed the dependency exemption for a cousin whose parents lived in the Dominican Republic, but the taxpayer was not entitled to the EITC because the cousin was not a
qualifying child. Similarly, in Hartfield v. Commissioner, No. 7439-05S (T.C. May 11, 2006), the
Tax Court concluded that although the taxpayer was entitled to claim the dependency exemption for his girlfriend’s child because he met the residency and support tests, he was not
able to claim the child for purposes of the EITC.
138. Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 201, 118 Stat.
1166, 1169–71.
139. See I.R.C. § 152(d).
140. A non-relative is not a qualifying child for purposes of the child tax credit. See id.
§ 24(c).
141. Id. § 24(c)(1).
142. See id. §§ 32(c)(3), 152(c)(3)(A)(i).
143. See id. § 152(c)(3)(A)(ii).
144. See id. § 152(c)(3)(B).
145. Professor Leslie Book analyzed several factors contributing to EITC noncompliance based on categories of taxpayer behavior and argued that the IRS must focus on these
categories rather than the error rate. Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does
Not Fit All, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1145, 1177#78 (2003).
146. Brown, supra note 22, at 800-01.
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connection between EITC recipients and welfare recipients.”
These errors are uncovered because approximately 50% of all individual tax return audits are those in which the taxpayer claimed
148
the EITC rather than higher income taxpayers. According to
Professor Brown, the premise that errors are attributable to fraud
is based on critical race issues and the faulty perception that Afri149
can Americans and Hispanics are the primary EITC claimants.
Professor Forman has identified additional problems with the
EITC. He argues that the EITC should be converted from an
earned income credit to a wage subsidy credit because the current
tax incentive not only provides benefits to high-wage individuals,
but also because these benefits exceed those provided to low-wage
150
earners. One problem he identifies is that there is not necessarily
151
horizontal equity between two workers where one of the workers
works half of the hours that the other worker works but earns double the hourly rate, particularly where the worker with the higher
147. Id. at 806-07.
148. Id. at 808. Professor Brown also discusses the precertification requirement for
25,000 EITC claimants implemented by the IRS beginning in 2004 that required these
claimants to provide eligibility documentation in order to receive the EITC. Id. at 809#10; see
also Stephen D. Holt, Keeping It in Context: Earned Income Tax Credit Compliance and Treatment
of the Working Poor, 6 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 183, 190 (2007) (finding that the audit rate for
high income taxpayers has increased but audits of EITC claimants remains substantially
higher); James L. Rockney, Note, Prove It or Lose It: The Certification Program for Select Individuals Claiming the Earned Income Tax Credit, 2 Pitt. Tax Rev. 49, 60 (2004) (discussing the
precertification requirement resulting in audits of a random sample of taxpayers claiming
the EITC and noting that “in all fairness . . . [the IRS] should also tailor a certification program for those other taxpayers in higher brackets who have historically abused the tax
system and amassed fortunes with tax avoidance schemes”). But see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr.,
Welfare by Any Other Name: Tax Transfers and the EITC, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 1261, 1275 (2007)
(“To the extent a small number of EITC claimants are required to precertify their eligibility
for benefits, or that otherwise EITC eligibles shown to have made erroneous claims in previous years are prevented from claiming the EITC for as many as ten years (for fraud), is, to
my mind, a realistic price to pay.” (footnote omitted)). A recent New York Times article
supports the conclusion that the government could benefit by auditing the tax returns of
wealthy taxpayers. In the article, it was reported that a former chief executive of an accounting firm was indicted for selling bogus tax shelters to wealthy taxpayers costing the
government billions of dollars in tax losses between 1994 and 2004 and $3.9 billion from
1998 to 2000. Lynnley Browning, 7 Indicted on Charges of Selling Tax Shelters, N.Y. Times, June
10, 2009, at B1.
149. Brown, supra note 22, at 824. But see Bekah Mandell, Race and State-Level Earned Income Tax Credits: Another Case of Welfare Racism?, 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 1, 19#23 (2008)
(outlining several factors to establish that people of color disproportionately receive the
EITC including low-wage jobs, larger family sizes, higher single parent families, and high
concentration in the south where there are lower wages).
150. Forman, supra note 103, at 81.
151. One of the goals of the income tax is horizontal equity. Under horizontal equity
principles, similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed similarly. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge,
Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58
Tax L. Rev. 399, 401 (2005).
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rate works fewer hours because of “labor-leisure choices.” He posits that “a net worth or resources test” for determining the EITC
phase-out may provide a better solution because it prevents an individual with little earned income but a high net worth from
claiming the credit consistent with “typical welfare programs” such
153
as the Aid for Dependent Children program.
An additional problem indirectly impacting the EITC tax incentive is the substantial transfer of benefits to tax preparers and rapid
loan providers. Many low-income workers fall prey to the allure of
rapid refunds offered by some paid preparers for hefty fees. Evidence establishes that approximately $2 billion of EITC claims are
paid to paid preparers and loan providers, resulting in a 6.7% loss
154
of EITC benefits to the low-income claimant. Because of limited
financial services, low-income individuals are easy targets for refund-anticipation loans and other services such as rent-to-own
155
transactions, pawn shops, and check cashing outlets. Additional
regulation of return preparation is necessary to reduce the sub156
stantial EITC benefits paid to preparers and loan providers. With
free electronic filing and return preparation available through the
IRS’s VITA program, it is troubling that many low-income workers
unnecessarily relinquish a portion of their EITC to paid preparers
for high-interest rapid refunds.
152. Forman, supra note 103, at 81.
153. Id. at 88.
154. Rockney, supra note 148, at 58. Another concluded that “loans with triple-digit interest rates are now attached to nearly half of all EITC refund dollars. Overall, roughly $1.75
billion intended to benefit low-income families flows instead to commercial tax preparers
and affiliated national banks.” Silverman, supra note 82, at 490 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
155. See Jim Hawkins, Renting the Good Life, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2041, 2076#77
(2009) (stating “that most rent-to-own customers have low incomes” and that the “APR is
frequently above 200 percent”); Silverman, supra note 82, at 486-89 (stating that the working
poor rely on a second-tier financial system that includes pawnshops, check cashing outlets,
rent-to-own stores, and tax refund anticipation lenders); see also Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer
Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of Class Position, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 557, 593#94 (2009)
(“Borrowers who are driven by need, however, know that payday lenders are exploiting them,
that credit cards are a trap, and that rent-to-own stores are a rip-off, but in the face of such
dire need, the price of credit and the effects of indebtedness become irrelevant. In the absence
of alternatives, these borrowers do not have the luxury to meaningfully consider the long-term
consequences of incurring high priced debt.” (emphasis in original)(footnotes omitted));
Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 Chap. L. Rev. 79, 83 (2000) (stating that the
regulation of the credit card industry could have negative consequences on low-income individuals because they might be driven back to pawnbrokers, rent-to-own establishments, and
loan sharks).
156. See Cords, supra note 121, at 355 (advocating that increased regulation of tax preparers and oversight of loan providers are necessary). See generally Michele Estrin Gilman,
Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based Welfare System, 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
721, 813 (2005) (stating the flaw that “the low-wage population is preyed upon by tax preparers who take a hefty share of the tax credit” needs to be corrected).
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Finally, the current EITC provisions do not encourage recipients
to save a portion of their EITC benefits. Unlike other government
transfer programs, “families who receive the EITC experience a
greater freedom and increased potential to invest in long-term
purchases and equities, enabling them to reduce their vulnerabil157
ity.” While the legislative history indicates that one purpose of the
tax incentive is to “funnel[] funds to persons likely to spend the
money immediately,” it also states that the credit is intended to
provide relief for individuals hurt by inflationary food and energy
158
costs. The EITC needs to incorporate a savings component to
ensure recipients can sustain payment for such necessities upon
retirement. As already discussed in this Article, the government
promotes low-income individuals to save in other ways, but there
are several limitations on those efforts.
VI. Adding a Saving Component to the EITC
A. In General
This section will outline a proposal to amend the Internal Revenue Code to increase the incentive for the working poor and other
low-income workers to save for retirement. President Barack
Obama’s budget includes proposals to increase the savings rate of
low-income and middle income workers. His budget includes an
expansion of the saver’s credit by making it refundable, mandating
that employers automatically enroll employees in their retirement
plans, and requiring employers who do not offer retirement plans
159
to enroll employees in direct-deposit IRAs. The President’s proposal also suggests converting the saver’s credit to a refundable one
with a 50% match on $1000 of savings for families earning less than
160
$65,000. The Obama administration estimates that implementation of the proposal will increase the participation rate of these
161
workers to 80%. Even if Congress enacts President Obama’s proposal, Congress should still add a savings component to the EITC
157. Mandell, supra note 149, at 19.
158. Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 864 (1986).
159. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise 84#85 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/
fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Responsibility2.pdf. Senator Jeff Bingaman recently introduced a bill into the Senate to require employers without qualified plans to automatically
enroll their employees into IRAs subject to employee opt out. See Automatic IRA Act of
2010, S. 3760, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2010).
160. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 159, at 85.
161. Id.
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because it does not address many of the challenges that lowincome individuals have in saving for retirement.
B. Proposed Expansion of the EITC
1. In General
The EITC has gained nonpartisan support and represents an integral component of tax policy. Empirical data indicates that the
majority of EITC benefits is used to pay bills, but that 49% of recipients save a portion of the credit to purchase a car or home or save
162
for education. However, as already noted, the EITC has its share
of shortcomings. In light of these shortcomings, scholars have proposed modifications to the EITC. One interesting proposal is to
expand the EITC to reach more low-income workers who do not
have qualifying children because they frequently financially support noncustodial children and pay a large percentage of their
163
income in payroll, sales, and excise taxes. That proposal also argues that the EITC should be expanded to these low-income
164
workers to promote saving for education and retirement. The
rationale for this proposal is as follows:
With the national savings rate at zero, innovative approaches
that promote savings and asset building for all low-income
workers deserve support. The current tax structure favors asset building among middle and upper income families, but
has too little to offer those with low incomes and low tax liabilities. . . . An expanded EITC linked to opportunities for
single low-wage workers to save and build assets could achieve
a number of worthwhile social policy goals, including financing primary and secondary educations for the children of
non-custodial parents as well as reducing the number of peo165
ple facing poverty in retirement.
I agree that the scope of the EITC should be expanded to im166
plement the objective of saving for retirement. However, the
expansion should not be limited to low-income workers who lack
162. Mandell, supra note 149, at 18 (citing Timothy M. Smeeding et al., The EITC: Expectation, Knowledge, Use, and Economic and Social Mobility, 53 Nat’l Tax J. 1187, 1203 (2000)).
163. Gitterman et al., supra note 29, at 249-50.
164. Id. at 248.
165. Id. at 249.
166. Cf. Smeeding, supra note 14, at 18 (“Clearly there is potential for the EITC to be
linked to asset-building policy.”).
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qualifying children. A portion of a taxpayer’s EITC should be contributed to a retirement savings vehicle. The fact that many
taxpayers lack access to retirement accounts should not prevent
implementation of this proposal. President Obama’s proposal to
require employers to enroll employees in a direct-deposit IRA if
the employer lacks a retirement plan is worth consideration. In
addition, the federal government already has a template in place to
solve the problem of lack of access to retirement accounts: the
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). The TSP was created under the Federal
167
Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986. As originally enacted,
the TSP was a program for Federal civilian employees only; however, beginning with fiscal year 2001, it was extended to members of
168
the military. The Thrift Savings Plan Enhancement Act of 2009
made several additional changes to the TSP, including: 1) ending
the one year waiting period for Agency contributions in order to
enable employees to immediately receive a one percent automatic
Agency contribution and potentially an Agency match; 2) creating
automatic enrollment for civilian employees, but not for military
personnel; 3) allowing a deceased participant’s spouse to leave savings in the TSP account instead of requiring mandatory
withdrawal; 4) allowing participants to contribute after-tax dollars
to the TSP and avoid tax on earnings consistent with Roth IRAs;
and 5) allowing (but not requiring) participants the opportunity to
169
invest in a variety of mutual funds selected by the Agency. While
the current TSP only covers federal government employees and
members of the military, Congress could either extend the TSP to
EITC recipients or establish a similar vehicle for the program. Because of the barriers to savings for low-income workers, including
lack of access to retirement plans and lack of investment savvy, the
creation of a program similar to the TSP or the requirement that
employers enroll employees in a direct-deposit IRA where the employer lacks a retirement plan is critical to the success of the
expansion of the EITC.

167. Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-335, § 206, 100
Stat. 514, 593-94.
168. Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L.
No. 106-398, § 661, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-167 (2000).
169. See Legislative Changes to the Thrift Savings Plan, Thrift Savings Plan, 1–2 (Aug.
2009), https://www.tsp.gov/PDF/formspubs/oc09-16.pdf.
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2. Basic Structure of a Revamped EITC
a. Investment Income Restriction
The EITC statutory scheme prohibits a recipient from claiming
the credit where investment income exceeds $3100 for the taxable
170
year. Investment income includes taxable and tax-exempt interest, dividends, net rents, net royalties, net capital gains, and passive
171
activity income to the extent that it exceeds passive activity losses.
According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, individuals with
meaningful assets can dispose of them to purchase consumable
172
products. In addition, Medicaid, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, and other government programs have asset tests to
determine eligibility and rely on caseworkers to determine eligibil173
ity.
Because interest, dividends, rents, and royalties are derived from
assets, they serve as “a proxy for an asset-based test” for determin174
ing EITC eligibility. Consequently, a low-income individual whose
assets generate substantial income is unable to receive the EITC
tax subsidy. However, the legislative history is devoid of any indication that this proxy applies to assets held in retirement savings
accounts. The expansion of the EITC program to encourage retirement savings is not inconsistent with the reasons underlying the
excess investment income prohibition. The investment income restriction therefore should remain in force but should not apply to
any retirement savings or any accrued earnings from such savings.
b. Necessity of Automatic Contributions
Neoclassical economists support individual choice rather than a
policy of paternalism that is typical in many employer benefit plans
175
because they allow for the least amount of individual choice. The
greatest range of choices is superior to more limited choices because an individual has a greater opportunity to select the optimal

170. See Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1111.
171. I.R.C. § 32(i)(2).
172. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 104th Congress, General Explanation
of Tax Legislation Enacted in the 104th Congress 390 (Comm. Print 1996), available
at http://www.jct.gov/s-12-96.pdf.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Weiss, supra note 46, at 1289.
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176

choice. According to this approach, the decision to save or con177
sume is an example of rational human behavior. Neoclassical
economists also consider extremely low levels of saving to be ra178
tional. However, neoclassical economists recognize that some
restriction on individual choice may be necessary because “savings
179
affects the welfare of future generations.”
In contrast to the neoclassical economic theory, the proposal to
modify the EITC is based on the choice architecture theory advanced by Professors Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein.
Under this theory, a choice architect influences behavior by de180
signing the available options for a decision maker. The choice
architect attempts to persuade, or “nudge,” people to make certain
choices that the architect perceives to be beneficial for those peo181
ple. The decision to contribute to a retirement savings plan
presents an individual with a choice and a consequence that are
separated in time. According to choice architecture theory, individuals need “nudges” for these types of decisions because they do
182
not get “prompt feedback.”
Offering a “nudge” can have a profound impact in encouraging
the working poor and other low-income workers to invest in retirement savings. The employer match has not succeeded in
increasing the participation rate of the working poor and other
183
low-income workers. Therefore, an additional nudge may be required to increase their retirement savings.
The creation of automatic enrollment programs may provide
184
the nudge for some workers to save for retirement. The Pension
185
Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) created a safe harbor for employers
who wanted to establish automatic enrollment programs for their
employees. Prior to 2006, automatic enrollment was possible, but
many employers did not utilize it because of perceived “potential

176. See Matthew Venhorst, Note, Helping Individual Investors Do What They Know Is Right:
The Save More for Retirement Act of 2005, 13 Conn. Ins. L.J. 113, 127 (2006–2007).
177. See Weiss, supra note 46, at 1286.
178. Id. at 1298.
179. Id. at 1291.
180. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 3.
181. Id. at 6. Professors Thaler and Sunstein define a nudge as “any aspect of the choice
architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.” Id.
182. Id. at 74.
183. See id. at 109.
184. See id. at 110.
185. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 902, 120 Stat. 780, 1033#40.
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186

legal liability.” The PPA details how employers can automatically
enroll their employees in a retirement plan while meeting ERISA’s
187
nondiscrimination rules. The PPA does not mandate automatic
enrollment, but it provides an incentive for its use by giving employers the ability to automatically enroll their employees in
retirement plans without fear of violations of ERISA. Under the
PPA, the retirement plan administrator must provide notice of the
employee’s rights to eligible employees within a reasonable time
188
period before each plan year. The plan must have an opt-out feature, and the notice must clearly explain that feature. It must also
include a description of investment options to the extent that the
plan contains such options.
In addition, the IRS facilitates automatic enrollment by providing sample amendments that can assist employers, plan sponsors,
and practitioners in establishing an automatic enrollment feature
189
to retirement plans. The sample amendments are designed to aid
in the drafting of an automatic enrollment plan and are intended
to allow for modifications to comport with the plan’s terms and
190
procedures. They provide employers with sample language that
outlines the specifics of automatic enrollment into an employer
plan, including the default percentage, annual increases to the default percentage up to a cap, and mandatory notice requirements
that allow for an employee to opt out of the automatic enrollment
191
or to elect a different percentage to be invested in the plan.
Participation in automatic enrollment plans has been increasing
since the enactment of the PPA. According to a survey conducted
by the Profit Sharing/401K Council of America, participation in
automatic enrollment plans increased from 23.6% in 2006 to
192
35.6% in 2007. However, in the case of low-income workers, the
automatic enrollment feature alone will not sufficiently increase
their retirement savings because of the lack of access to employer
retirement plans.
186. EBRI Policy Forum: Defined Contribution Plans in a Post-PPA Environment, EBRI Notes
(Emp. Benefit Res. Inst., Washington, D.C.), July 2008, at 2, 2, available at
http://ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_07-2008.pdf.
187. Under ERISA, there are standards and percentages for determining whether there
is discrimination between the “highly compensated employees” and all other employees. See
I.R.C. § 401(k)(3)(A)(ii).
188. Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 501.
189. See I.R.S. Notice 2009-65, 2009-39 I.R.B. 413-18.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. David Wray & Hattie Greenan, Survey Finds Growing 401(k) Success, Defined Contributions Insight Magazine, Nov./Dec. 2008, http://www.psca.org/DCIMagazineMembers/
tabid/133/ctl/Detail/mid/490/Id/1024/Archive/Default.aspx.
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Where a low-income employee lacks access, I propose that the
automatic enrollment feature should be tied to an investment vehicle similar to the TSP or to an IRA in order to increase
retirement savings for the low-income worker. In order to implement the automatic enrollment feature, 10% of the recipient’s
EITC subsidy should be allocated to the retirement savings account. Based on the maximum EITC benefits for taxable year 2009,
the amount of the benefits to be refunded to the recipient and automatically contributed to a retirement savings account are as
193
follows:
No
Children

One
Child

Two
Children

Three or
More Children

Maximum EITC

$457.00

$3,034.00

$5,028.00

$5,657.00

EITC to be refunded
to employee

$411.30

$2,730.60

$4,525.20

$5,091.30

EITC to retirement
account

$ 45.70

$303.40

$502.80

$565.70

These figures show that the primary objective of the EITC will
not be frustrated by the automatic allocation of 10% of the EITC to
a retirement savings account. The amount of the EITC benefits to
be refunded to the recipient will continue to represent a substantial increase in the recipient’s after-tax income. Moreover, the
EITC benefits will be supplemented by other refundable credits,
194
such as the additional child tax credit.
c. Matching Component
Under my proposal, the maximum amount that can be allocated
to a retirement savings account under the EITC is $1000 for single
taxpayers and $2000 for married taxpayers filing a joint return.
These figures are identical to the maximum allowable saver’s credit. This amount is only available where the EITC recipient
contributes an amount in excess of the automatic contribution
from the EITC benefits. To the extent that an EITC recipient contributes money to an existing IRA or 401(k) retirement plan or
elects to contribute an additional portion of the EITC benefits in
excess of the automatic contribution during the current taxable
year, the recipient should be entitled to a match from the government. The match should be dollar for dollar. The purpose of the
193.
194.

Rev. Proc. 2009-21, 2009-16 I.R.B. 862.
See I.R.C. § 24(d).
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match is to provide an additional incentive for the EITC recipient
to contribute additional money to a retirement account.
The match is illustrated in the following example. If a single
taxpayer with one child is entitled to the maximum EITC of $3034,
declines to opt out of the automatic 10% contribution, and contributes an additional $300 under an established 401(k) account or
IRA, that taxpayer will receive a total government subsidy of
$603.40 ($303.40 from the automatic contribution plus a match of
$300). Consequently, the taxpayer will have a total amount of
$903.40 contributed to a retirement account but only $300 is contributed from the taxpayer’s wages. Alternatively, if the same
taxpayer does not opt out of the automatic contribution and elects
to have an additional 10% of the EITC benefits contributed to a
retirement account or IRA but does not make an additional contribution to the retirement account, the total amount contributed
on behalf of the taxpayer is $910.20 ($303.40 from the automatic
contribution, $303.40 additional contribution from the EITC, and
$303.40 from the match).
d. Role of Vesting
As noted above, with a qualified employer plan, employer contributions cannot be forfeited once the employee meets the vesting
195
requirements. The question arises as to whether vesting should
be applicable to the portion of EITC benefits that are contributed
to a retirement savings account. In the context of the EITC match,
the question is based on the length of time in which the contribution was held in a retirement account rather than length of service.
In other words, should an EITC recipient who has received a
match from the government forfeit it or a portion thereof if he or
she withdraws funds from the retirement savings account within a
certain period of time prior to reaching retirement age? I propose
that the EITC recipient should be fully vested in any automatic
contribution of EITC benefits to a retirement plan or IRA; if the
EITC recipient is not fully vested in these contributions, it will severely limit the participation level in the proposed program.
However, to protect the purpose of the proposed plan, the vesting
rules must apply to any match contributed by the government.
Under the vesting rules, the EITC recipient must forfeit the match
to the extent that automatic contributions or additional contributions are withdrawn prior to the end of the vesting period.
195.

See supra notes 50–51 and the accompanying text.
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Because the expanded EITC is more consistent with a defined
contribution plan, one of its vesting schedules should be applied.
The vesting schedule requiring 20% vesting two years after the
contribution and 20% increases each year for six years after the
contribution is more consistent with the purpose of encouraging
long-term saving. In order to implement this exception, a system of
“first in, first out” (also known as the accounting principle “FIFO”)
should be adopted. For example, assume that $500 is contributed
to a retirement savings account each year from an automatic contribution of $250 and an additional contribution of $250 by the
EITC recipient. The government provides a dollar for dollar match
of $250 each year. Excluding gains, the participant will have $1500
in the retirement account after the recipient’s contributions and
the government match. If the participant withdraws $700 after
making the contributions in the second year, $500 is taken from
the contribution made in year one first, and the full $250 match
from the first year of participation is forfeited. The $200 balance of
the withdrawal is taken from the EITC recipient’s contribution
made during the second year, and $200 of the match from the second year is also lost. Because the EITC recipient has withdrawn
80% of the remaining automatic or additional contribution, the
recipient also forfeits 80% of the match. The EITC recipient still
has $350 in the retirement account, and the recipient will be 20%
vested in the remaining match of $50 two years after the contribution. The following table outlines these principles:

Automatic Contribution
Additional Contribution
Government Match for
Additional Contribution
Total
Total in Retirement Account
after $700 Withdrawal

Year One Contributions and
Match
$250
$250
$250

Year Two Contributions and
Match
$250
$250
$250

$750
$0

$750
$350 ($300 Recipient
Contributions and $50 Match)

e. Early Withdrawal Penalty
Generally, the Internal Revenue Code imposes a 10% additional
tax where a taxpayer withdraws money from a qualified retirement
196
plan prior to reaching the age of 59 ½. Equity considerations require that the penalty should continue to apply to any early
196.

I.R.C. § 72(t).
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withdrawal made by a recipient of the EITC. However, the penalty
should only apply to amounts received from the governmental
match, not from the participant’s contributions. This is distinguishable from traditional retirement accounts. The rationale for
this exception stems from the fundamental purpose of the EITC.
As already noted, two of the most important objectives of the EITC
are to offset the regressive nature of Social Security taxes and to
provide relief from inflationary food and energy prices for lowincome workers. These objectives may conflict with the goal of increased saving. The purpose of modifying the EITC is to reduce
the likelihood that low-income workers will need to rely completely
on Social Security benefits in retirement. It is of paramount importance that an EITC recipient not be dissuaded from
participating in the program for fear that if money is needed for
basic necessities of life, the EITC recipient must sacrifice a portion
197
of the EITC resulting from the 10% penalty. In other words, it is
unlikely that an EITC recipient will participate in a program that
may result in a forfeiture resulting from the 10% penalty when that
EITC recipient can receive the money upfront without any tax exposure. These considerations are not relevant when the match is at
issue. To the extent that an EITC participant is vested in the government match and makes an early withdrawal, the participant will
be subject to the 10% penalty on the withdrawal of the match. For
example, if a forty-year old EITC participant satisfies the vesting
requirements and withdraws the government match totaling $2000,
the participant will be subject to a $200 penalty. Conversely, a sixtyyear old participant will not be subject to the $200 penalty.
It is important to note that the exceptions from the early withdrawal penalty, including withdrawals for qualified higher
198
education expenses and qualified first-time homebuyer distribu199
tions, should apply to EITC retirement savings. With respect to
197. The 10% penalty does not apply to amounts forfeited where the participant is not
fully vested in the government contributions. As a result, a participant may forfeit a portion
of the government contribution under the vesting schedule and be subject to the 10% penalty for early withdrawal for the nonforfeited amount.
198. See id. § 72(t)(7). According to I.R.C. § 72(t), there is a 10% additional tax on early
distributions of qualified retirement plans, but the additional tax does not apply to qualified
higher education expenses if they are furnished to the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or
any child or grandchild of the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse if it is paid to an eligible
educational institution. See id. § 72(t)(7)(A)(i)-(iii).
199. See id. § 72(t)(8). The additional tax does not apply to “qualified first-time homebuyer distributions” if within 120 days of the distribution, the distribution is used to
purchase the principal residence of a first-time homebuyer and the purchaser is the taxpayer, the spouse of taxpayer, or any child, grandchild, or ancestor of the taxpayer or taxpayer’s
spouse. Id. § 72(t)(8)(A). In addition, the lifetime ceiling for “qualified first-time homebuyer distributions” cannot exceed $10,000. Id. § 72(t)(8)(B). Qualified acquisition costs
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qualified higher education expenses, the EITC rules already promote education by entitling the taxpayer to claim a full-time
student under the age of twenty-four as a qualifying child. While
the primary objective of an EITC sponsored retirement account is
to build retirement savings, the withdrawal of funds for educational purposes should not result in a penalty because it is consistent
with the purpose of reducing poverty of the elderly. The purchase
of a principal residence is similarly consistent with the desired goal
of asset accumulation.
C. Viability of Proposal
The proposal to add a savings component to the EITC should be
“fair, easy to comply with and administer, conducive to economic
growth, produce adequate revenue and provide little interference
200
with private economic decisions.” It meets the standard for viability. First, it is a fair proposal. It comports with vertical equity in that
it is targeted solely at the lowest income taxpayers, unlike the saver’s credit. It also satisfies the horizontal equity principle in that
similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed similarly. Historical
data establishes that because certain categories of workers lack access to employer retirement plans, they are not provided with the
opportunity to contribute wages to a tax-deferred retirement plan
and therefore are not being taxed similarly to a taxpayer who earns
the same wages. My proposed expansion of the EITC corrects this
horizontal equity problem by enabling many low-income workers
to contribute a small portion of their EITC to a retirement vehicle.
Second, the proposal is easy to comply with and to administer.
While complexity is difficult to avoid in any tax provision, the
structure of the expanded EITC meets the criteria: it is already a
part of an established statutory provision; the computation of the
credit will not change; and the implementation of the EITC proposal should not create too great of an administrative burden.
Obviously, the Department of the Treasury will need to amend a
few tax forms and related publications to implement the proposed
expansion of the EITC. To the extent that a low-income worker
include “acquiring, constructing, or reconstructing a residence” and “settlement, financing,
or other closing costs.” Id. § 72(t)(8)(C). An individual qualifies as a first-time homebuyer if
the individual had no ownership of a home two years prior to the date of acquisition. Id.
§ 72(t)(8)(D).
200. Vada Waters Lindsey, The Widening Gap Under the Internal Revenue Code: The Need for
Renewed Progressivity, 5 Fla. Tax Rev. 1, 43 (2001) (citing Michael J. Graetz, The Decline
(and Fall?) of the Income Tax 10 (1997)).
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already contributes to an established 401(k) plan or IRA, the government match can be done electronically through the same direct
deposit method that is already in place. The proposal establishing
an automatic contribution and match minimizes complexity. The
EITC is automatically reduced by 10% of the credit. If a recipient
wants to opt out of the automatic contribution, the recipient
should only be required to check a newly created box on the tax
return. To the extent that an EITC recipient has made a contribution to an IRA or 401(k) plan during the taxable year entitling the
recipient to the match, it is reflected on the tax return consistently
with the manner in which it is currently reported. There is no added complexity because this information is already reported for
purposes of the saver’s credit. With respect to compliance, the government needs to continue to reduce the error rate of EITC
returns; however, the establishment of a savings component to the
EITC should not create additional compliance concerns.
Third, the proposal is conducive to economic growth. In the
short-term, it may appear otherwise. However, only a small percentage of the EITC will be automatically contributed to a retirement
plan or IRA. The vast majority of the EITC will continue to stimulate
the economy by providing much-needed funds to recipients to purchase basic necessities. It will also improve long-term economic
growth by helping to reduce the number of retirees who are living
below the poverty level.
Fourth, the cost of the proposal must be considered. According
to the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, tax incentives cost
the federal government $500 billion per year or over 4% of the
201
gross domestic product. During taxable year 2006, the total EITC
202
claimed by all taxpayers was approximately $44.4 billion. The cost
of my proposal will likely increase this amount. However, the cost
of the proposal is offset by the fact that the recipient is already entitled to the amount automatically contributed to a retirement
201. Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax
Credits, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 43 (2006) (citing Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th
Congress, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2006–2010
(Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter Estimates], available at http://www.jct.gov/s-2-06.pdf).
202. See Justin Bryan, Individual Income Tax Returns, 2006, SOI Bull., Fall 2008, at 5, 12
fig.H, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08fallbul.pdf. The $44.4 billion was significantly lower than other tax incentives that primarily benefited wealthy taxpayers. During
the same taxable year, over 90% of net capital gains and qualified dividends were claimed by
taxpayers with income of at least $100,000. See id. at 11 fig.F. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the reduced rate on capital gains and dividends cost the
federal government approximately $92 billion in lost revenue. See Estimates, supra note
201, at 34 tbl.1. In addition, the staff estimated that the exclusion of capital gains at death
resulting from the “stepped-up” adjusted basis rules under I.R.C. § 1014 cost the government an additional $51 billion in lost revenues. See id.
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account and that the recipient will forfeit the government match if
the minimum vesting requirements are not met. In addition, taxpayers who receive an additional EITC allocated to retirement
savings are not entitled to claim the saver’s credit during the same
203
taxable year. As already noted, the maximum amount that a single taxpayer can receive under the proposed expansion of the
EITC is $1000 for single taxpayers and $2000 for married taxpayers
filing a joint return. These maximum amounts are consistent with
the current saver’s credit in order to minimize potential federal
revenue shortfall, although it is not a complete wash because the
saver’s credit is nonrefundable. Moreover, the enhancement of
current tax incentives for the working poor and other low-income
workers will lower the possibility that they will be dependent on
direct expenditures during their retirement years.
Finally, because the percentage that is automatically allocable to
a retirement savings vehicle is relatively nominal, implementation
of the proposal does not significantly interfere with private economic decisions, since EITC recipients are entitled to opt out of
the automatic contributions based on their own financial needs.
VII. Conclusion
In recent years, Congress enacted tax incentives to benefit lowincome workers by placing more tax dollars in their wallets. The
204
205
recently-enacted Making Work Pay, First-Time Homebuyer, and
203. This approach is used for other tax incentives. For example, there are several tax
incentives that are intended to encourage education. Taxpayers can claim the nonrefundable Hope or Lifetime Learning Credit. See I.R.C. § 25A. The Code also allows for an above
the line deduction for tuition and fees. See id. § 222. However, both sections deny any possibility of a double benefit by stating that the taxpayer must elect either the deduction or
credit but not both. See id. §§ 25A(g)(5), 222(c).
204. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1001, 123
Stat. 115, 309#12. For taxable years 2009 and 2010, low and middle-income workers generally will receive the credit in the form of lower withholdings, but some workers will receive
their benefits in the form of a refundable credit on their tax returns. Id. § 1001, 123 Stat. at
310; see I.R.S. News Release IR-2009-13 (Feb. 21, 2009). The maximum credit is $400 ($800
for a married couple filing a joint return). American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 1001,
123 Stat. at 310.
205. In 2008, in order to reinvigorate the housing market, Congress enacted a maximum
refundable credit of $7500 or 10% of the purchase price of a principal residence purchased
on or after April 9, 2008 and before July 1, 2009. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3011, 122 Stat. 2654, 2888-91. Congress extended the refundable credit to December 1, 2009, increased the credit to $8000, and eliminated the obligation
to repay under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act § 1006. There are currently several proposals that have been introduced in the House and Senate to expand the current $8000 tax credit. See Stephanie
Armour, Tax Credit for Home Purchase Could Rise; Proposals Call for Expanding Benefits, U.S.A.
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206

American Opportunities refundable credits
supplement the
longstanding refundable credits that include the EITC and the
Additional Child Tax Credit. These established programs provide
much-needed cash for low-income workers and help them acquire
an education and purchase consumable products. With the exception of the First-Time Homebuyer Credit, however, these credits do
little to encourage asset accumulation. Therefore, additional tax
incentives are required to encourage wealth accumulation in the
form of retirement savings because the incentives to save that are
targeted at the working poor and other low-income workers are
ineffective. The saver’s credit has proven to be ineffective as a tax
incentive for the working poor. Many low-income workers lack access to employer qualified 401(k) plans. This is particularly true for
part-time employees, employees working in a service occupation,
and employees working for small businesses.
All individuals, including low-income workers, need to rely on
the “three-legged stool” of Social Security, pension plans, and personal savings to finance their retirement years. In order to provide
an additional incentive for low-income workers to save for retirement, the EITC should be expanded to add a savings component.
This expansion must include an automatic enrollment option. The
ability of an employer to establish an automatic enrollment option
has been strengthened by the PPA. In order to counter the lack of
access by low-income workers, part-time employees, and non-white
employees, a savings vehicle similar to the TSP should be utilized.
Ten percent of the EITC benefits should automatically be added to
a retirement savings vehicle. To the extent that the recipient of
EITC benefits contributes a greater percentage to a retirement savings vehicle, the government should match the contribution dollar
for dollar, with a maximum contribution of $1000. That figure
equals the maximum credit allowable under the saver’s credit for
single taxpayers. Married taxpayers filing a joint return are entitled
Today, June 22, 2009, at 1A. Economists believe that expansion of the credit is critical to
the housing market recovery. Id.
206. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 1004. The Act expands the eligible expenses to include books and computer equipment not purchased from the educational
institution, provides a maximum credit of $2500, allows for a portion of the education credits to be refundable, and applies to expenses related to the first four years of postsecondary
education. Id. Congress enacted the American Opportunity Tax Credit because of representations by some that the cost of post-secondary education has grown faster than the
inflationary rate and that the expansion of the credit will help people with financial difficulties obtain a post-secondary education. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 111th
Congress, Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal
Year 2010 Budget Proposal—Part One: Individual Income Tax and Estate and Gift
Tax Provisions 107 (Comm. Print 2009), available at http://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=startdown&id=3573.
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to the same $2000 maximum government contribution that is allowed under the saver’s credit. The taxpayer would not be
permitted to receive both the EITC retirement benefits and claim
the saver’s credit in the same taxable year. Finally, the match that
an EITC recipient receives will be forfeited to the extent that the
recipient is not vested in it. To the extent that the recipient is vested in the benefits but withdraws the amounts contributed to a
retirement account prior to reaching age 59 ½, the recipient will
be subject to the early distribution penalty of 10%, unless the withdrawal or distribution meets one of the allowable exceptions.
As noted, the EITC has received nonpartisan support. While the
EITC’s error rate has historically been high, it remains an important tax incentive. The modifications to the credit suggested in
my proposal satisfy the equity principle of fairness. If properly
structured, it should not be too complicated to administer. In addition, consistent with many other tax incentives, its implementation
will impact federal revenue. However, because of the numerous
barriers to saving experienced by low-income workers and the importance of ensuring that low-income individuals have
accumulated sufficient retirement assets, my proposal will create
an effective vehicle for encouraging recipients of the EITC to save.
Finally, implementation of the proposal will not significantly impact the primary goals of the EITC.

